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Offshoring, Tasks, and the Skill-Wage Pattern
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The paper investigates the relationship between offshoring, wages, and the ease with which 
individuals' tasks can be offshored. Our analysis relates to recent theoretical contributions 
arguing that there is only a loose relationship between the suitability of a task for offshoring 
and the associated skill level. Accordingly, wage effects of offshoring can be very 
heterogeneous within skill groups. We test this hypothesis by combining micro-level 
information on wages and demographic and workplace characteristics as well as 
occupational information relating to the degree of offshorability with industry-level data on 
offshoring. Our main results suggest that in partial equilibrium, wage effects of offshoring are 
fairly modest but far from homogeneous and depend significantly on the extent to which the 
respective task requires personal interaction or can be described as non-routine. When 
allowing for cross-industry movement of workers, i.e., looking at a situation closer to general 
equilibrium, the magnitude of the wage effects of offshoring becomes substantial. Low- and 
medium-skilled workers experience significant wage cuts due to offshoring which, however, 
again strongly depend on the degree of personal interaction and non-routine content. 
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Research on job tasks has become increasingly popular in recent years. This is
re°ected in the labor economics literature by, for example, Autor et al. (2003),
Spitz-Oener (2006) and Gathmann and SchÄ onberg (2010). In the international
trade literature, the concept of tasks has also entered into the debate on in-
ternational outsourcing or o®shoring. For example, Blinder (2006) argues that
certain tasks that are interactive, i.e., require face-to-face contact are unlikely
to be o®shored (e.g., hairdressers, lawyers) while tasks without these charac-
teristics may easily be moved abroad (e.g., computer programmers). Levy and
Murnane (2004) and Leamer and Storper (2001) also highlight the di®erences
between what may be called routine and non-routine tasks, with the latter be-
ing less likely to be moved abroad. Grossmann and Rossi-Hansberg's (2008)
in°uential paper picks up this thread, proposing a theoretical model that essen-
tially rede¯nes o®shoring as trade in tasks rather than in the common meaning
of trade in intermediate products.
What is clear from the earlier literature and also from the empirical work
presented in this paper is that tasks are not synonymous with skills. While there
may be some overlap, non-routine or more interactive tasks are not necessar-
ily identical with higher educational attainment. This is an important point
that has strong implications for the potential labor market e®ects of o®shoring.
Traditionally, the literature has concluded that o®shoring from industrialized
countries has led to a shift in labor demand towards more skilled workers, im-
plying that unskilled workers lose while skilled workers gain from this form of
globalization (e.g., Feenstra and Hanson, 2001) . However, when considering
tasks as well as skills, the conclusions change. This is what we show in this
paper.
By using very rich individual-level panel data, we are able to assess in detail
wages, skill levels, and the nature of the tasks performed by individuals in their
jobs. This is combined with data on o®shoring activities of the industry. We use
this data to empirically model the impact of o®shoring on wages, and focus on
how the wage e®ect of o®shoring is simultaneously determined by the skill levels
and tasks carried out by individuals. Thus, we study the interaction between
skill levels and tasks and investigate whether within skill groups, the nature
of tasks carried out by an individual determines the e®ects of o®shoring on
3wages. As Grossman and Rossi-Hansberg (2008) have suggested, the e®ects of
o®shoring depend on the cost of trading tasks, which may di®er across di®erent
types of tasks. Hence, our working hypothesis is that, in the absence of a one-
to-one relationship between tasks and skills, the interaction of the two variables
matters. Our empirical results support this hypothesis.
We use two strategies for identifying a link between o®shoring and wages.
The ¯rst is to use within-industry changes in o®shoring intensity and wages.
Here, we look only at changes in the wages of individuals staying in an industry,
and not those that occur due to an individual moving from one industry to
another as a consequence of o®shoring. This makes our analysis essentially a
short-run, partial equilibrium analysis.1
The second identi¯cation strategy is based on the idea that, in general equi-
librium, individual i's wage is determined not only by o®shoring activity in the
industry in which i is employed, but also by what is going on in other industries.
Speci¯cally, the wages of i holding occupation k will, in general equilibrium, de-
pend on o®shoring activities a®ecting occupation k in any industry. Take, for
example, electrical engineers working in the automobile and machinery indus-
tries. O®shoring an engineer's tasks in automobiles a®ects not only engineers
in this industry, but also in the machinery industry, as engineers may move
from automobiles into machinery and vice versa. Note, of course, that actual
movement of workers is not required to generate these cross-industry e®ects:
the potential for movement is su±cient.
In the growing literature on o®shoring and tasks, we are, to the best of
our knowledge, the ¯rst to explicitly investigate the interaction between tasks
and skills in order to gauge the e®ect of o®shoring of activities on wages.2
We look at the labor market e®ect of o®shoring by examining individual-level
wages rather than relative demand for labor at the ¯rm or industry level.3 This
1This is a common assumption in the literature. It is, for example, implicit in the studies
examining the relationship between relative labor demand and o®shoring using aggregate industry-
level data (Feenstra and Hanson, 2001). Studies using individual-level data, such as Geishecker and
GÄ org (2008) or Liu and Tre°er (2008) are based on the same assumption.
2The paper most closely related to ours is by Ebenstein et al. (2009), who use micro data to
de¯ne occupations as routine or non-routine. They do not consider possible interactions between
tasks and skills, as suggested by other empirical work, however. Moreover, we expand on this
paper by using not only the routine vs. non-routine distinction, but as an alternative approach,
also classify occupations according to whether they are based on interactive vs. non-interactive
tasks. In addition, Crinµ o (2010) looks at the impact of services o®shoring on labour demand while
di®erentiating between \tradable" and \non-tradable" occupations. Finally, Baumgarten (2009)
uses micro data to investigate the relationship between o®shoring, tasks, and employment stability.
3Feenstra and Hanson (1996) is one of the standard references for such studies at the industry
4allows us to take account of individual-level heterogeneity, controlling for a
host of observable and unobservable e®ects at the individual and industry level,
thereby avoiding aggregation bias.4
Our empirical results show that wage e®ects of o®shoring are heterogeneous
between as well as within skill groups, depending on the degree of interactiv-
ity or non-routine content of the respective tasks of workers. Thus, the more
traditional dichotomy between high-skilled and low-skilled workers does indeed
need to be revised, taking the nature of tasks into account.
Another important ¯nding is that the partial equilibrium e®ect, that is,
the impact of o®shoring in the individual's own industry, is quite low. How-
ever, when looking at the e®ects of o®shoring in a situation that more closely
corresponds to a general equilibrium setting|when allowing for worker mobil-
ity between industries|we ¯nd substantial wage e®ects that are economically
highly signi¯cant.5
In the next section, we provide a brief review of the theoretical background
that motivates our empirical analysis. We then give a detailed account of our
data and the classi¯cation of tasks according to their degree of interactivity
and non-routine content. Section 4 explains the empirical model and addresses
potential caveats. Our partial equilibrium results are presented in Section 5,
while Section 6 shows our estimates when allowing for cross-industry worker
mobility. Section 7 concludes the analysis.
2 Theoretical Background
The theoretical model of Grossman and Rossi-Hansberg (2008) can serve as a
guide to motivate our empirical analysis. In their model, a ¯rm produces output
using a continuum of tasks that are performed by either low-skilled (L-tasks) or
high-skilled (H-tasks) workers. These tasks can be carried out either at home or
abroad. O®shoring tasks is costly, and these costs di®er across tasks. Carrying
level. Becker et al. (2009) analyze the link between tasks, skills, o®shoring by multinationals, and
relative labor demand at the ¯rm level using German data. They estimate the relative demand for
skills and tasks, respectively, applying the framework by Feenstra and Hanson (1996). They do not,
however, allow for a possible interaction between skills and tasks.
4While the analysis of Ebenstein et al. (2009) is also at the individual level, the nature of their
data does not allow them to control for many observed individual characteristics or unobserved
individual e®ects.
5This may explain why papers (such as Liu and Tre°er, 2008) that only look at the partial
equilibrium (or own industry) e®ect often fail to ¯nd strong results and conclude that o®shoring
appears not to pose a signi¯cant threat to workers.
5out tasks abroad may be advantageous due to factor cost di®erences, but these
potential savings have to be weighed against the costs of o®shoring.
In this setup, there are three types of e®ects on wages if o®shoring costs
for one set of tasks decline, that is, if o®shoring of one set of tasks increases.
First, increased o®shoring of a speci¯c set of tasks raises the productivity of
the factor that usually performs these tasks, and thereby generates a real wage
increase for this factor. Second, there is a labor supply e®ect. The excess
workers who have been freed up through o®shoring have to be reabsorbed in
the economy, which leads to a fall in the real wage for the factor that performs
the o®shored tasks. Third, there is a relative price e®ect, whereby the price of
the ¯nal good that uses o®shoring declines. This will, via the familiar Stolper-
Samuelson e®ect, also negatively a®ect the wages of the workers that carry out
the o®shored task. In sum, the model predicts an ambiguous e®ect of increased
o®shoring depending on the relative strength of the positive productivity and
negative factor supply and relative price e®ects.
Note that, for our empirical strategy, it is important to point out that the
productivity and labor supply e®ects are elaborated in the Grossmann and
Rossi-Hansberg model in a setting where they focus on a single sector with a
¯xed supply of low- and high-skilled workers. This scenario corresponds to a
short-run view of the economy, where labor is immobile between industries, and
thus to our ¯rst identi¯cation strategy, where we examine the impact of changes
in within-industry o®shoring on within-industry wages, abstracting from the
mobility of labor across industries. These two e®ects also hold in general equi-
librium, where the additional relative price e®ect also comes into play.
Rather than solely testing the model predictions for low-skilled and high-
skilled workers, we expand on the idea that di®erent sets of tasks have di®erent
o®shoring costs, which may be only loosely related to skills. Thus, we go beyond
simply associating what Grossman and Rossi-Hansberg call \L-tasks" and \H-
tasks" with low-skilled and high-skilled workers. If it is indeed the case that,
for example,\non-routine tasks" are less easily o®shored (i.e., have higher costs
of being o®shored), as suggested in recent papers, then we would expect that,
within the group of, say, low-skilled workers, the wage e®ects of o®shoring
should di®er for those individuals carrying out non-routine tasks as compared
to those who perform simple routine tasks. The same goes for high-skilled
6workers. Our empirical results are in line with this contention.
3 Data and Methodology
The empirical strategy in this paper rests on combining individual-level data
on wages and worker characteristics with more aggregate data on o®shoring
activity and other observable industry characteristics. For the former, we use
data from the German Socio-Economic Panel (SOEP), an annual individual-
level survey, for the years 1991-2006.6 We restrict our unbalanced sample to
prime-age (18{65 years) employees in the manufacturing industry (NACE/ISIC
15{36). To account for gender-speci¯c labor market outcomes (see, e.g., Prasad,
2004; Beaudry and Green, 2003) we focus exclusively on males. In our empiri-
cal model, we utilize retrospectively collected yearly labor earnings and yearly
work hours from the Cross-National Equivalent ¯les (CNEF), including pay-
ments from bonuses, overtime, and pro¯t-sharing. Excluding observations with
missing or imputed wage information, this yields 13,189 observations for 2,063
individuals.7
In order to obtain task-based measures of o®shorability we employ occupa-
tional information following the classi¯cation of the German Federal Statistical
O±ce (Klassi¯zierung der Berufe { KldB92) that has only recently become
available in the SOEP. On the basis of this disaggregated occupational coding,
we can map associated task contents, which are calculated using yet another
micro-level data set, the German Quali¯cation and Career Survey 1998/99,
by applying two di®erent procedures that are based on Becker, Ekholm and
Muendler (2009) and Spitz-Oener (2006).8
To make the German Quali¯cation and Career Survey sample comparable
to the one used in our wage regression, we restrict the sample to males aged 18
6Speci¯cally, we use sample A{F of SOEP. The data was extracted using the add-on package
PanelWhiz for Stata. Panelwhiz (http://www.PanelWhiz.eu) was written by Dr. John P. Haisken
DeNew (john@PanelWhiz.eu). See Haisken-DeNew and Hahn (2006) for details. The do-¯le gen-
erated by PanelWhiz to retrieve the data in the present paper is available from the authors upon
request. Any data or computational errors in the paper are our own.
7According to Frick and Grabka (2003), the imputation procedure disregards industry-level
information such as o®shoring. As a result, the imputation of missing wage information compresses
the wage distribution with respect to the industry-level variables that are of most interest for our
analysis and is therefore not suitable for this application.
8The German Quali¯cation and Career Survey was previously used, for example, by DiNardo
and Pischke (1997). Like Becker et al. (2009) we rely on the most recent wave as it follows a
comparable occupational classi¯cation (KldB92).
7to 65, which leaves us with some 19,000 individuals (out of about 34,000). Our
occupational grouping is based on the two-digit level of the KldB92, which is
available in both data sets. Only in cases where occupational cells become too
small do we switch to the next-highest level of aggregation.9
The distinct advantage of this survey is that respondents not only state
their occupation but also give a detailed account of the tasks they perform on
the job and the associated work tools they use to do so. Using this detailed
information, Becker et al. (2009) propose a mapping of tasks into occupations.
In a ¯rst step, each of the 81 surveyed tools and thereby each task is classi¯ed
as (i) routine or non-routine and (ii) interactive or non-interactive, where the
former grouping refers to non-repetitive tasks and the latter to tasks requiring
interpersonal contact. For illustration, the use of an overhead projector or
beamer is coded as both non-routine and interactive, whereas the opposite holds
for computer-controlled machinery. Simple means of transport are an example
of tools denoting an interactive but routine task, whereas precision-mechanical
tools are coded as non-routine and non-interactive (see Table A1 in Appendix
1 for a list of surveyed tools and their respective classi¯cations).
In a next step, the number of non-routine and of interactive tasks are aver-
aged over occupations. Accordingly, a higher number implies a more intensive
use of the associated task category.
Finally, for every occupation, a continuous task intensity measure in the
range of 0 to 1| where 1 denotes maximum intensity |is derived by normal-
izing the ¯gures by the maximum sum of non-routine and interactive tasks in
any occupation. Thus, in compact form, the formula reads as follows:
TaskIntensity ij =
Average number of j-tasks in occupation i
Maximum average number of j-tasks
; (1)
where i denotes the occupation and j 2 fnon-routine, interactiveg the task
category.
To check the robustness of our results, we also use an alternative task classi¯-
cation which is based on a separate list of 13 job descriptions that is available in
the same data set (see Table A2 in Appendix 1). It is the same set of questions
that was ¯rst used by Spitz-Oener (2006) in her work on tasks, computerization,
and technical change and subsequently employed by, for example, Borghans et
9The classi¯cation contains ¯ve levels of aggregation. The two-digit level is the third-highest and
distinguishes 88 occupational groups. The next-highest consists of 33 occupational sections while the
highest level di®erentiates between six broad occupational areas (Statistisches Bundesamt, 1992).
8al. (2008) and Gathmann and SchÄ onberg (2010). Whereas Spitz-Oener (2006)
follows Autor et al. (2003) and creates ¯ve task categories, we focus on mea-
sures of non-routineness and interactivity in order to ensure comparability with
the Becker et al. (2009) mapping. The construction of the task measures is
analogous to the one described above.10 For ease of exposition, we will re-
fer to this alternative task classi¯cation in the following as Spitz-Oener-based
mapping even though it is not strictly identical. Although both task classi¯ca-
tions have their pros and cons, we have some preference for the Becker et al.
(2009) mapping since it is based on a more detailed set of questions and hence,
arguably, more suitable to re°ect task content variations across occupations.
Hence, occupations are classi¯ed according to their non-routine or inter-
active task contents, irrespective of the associated educational attainment of
workers. Accordingly, it is in principle possible to observe, for example, some
highly non-routine (interactive) tasks to be performed by low-skilled workers,
and vice versa.
To what extent non-routine and interactive tasks and skills, measured in
terms of educational attainment, are related is summarized in Table 1.11 As
becomes apparent in the mean comparison tests, high-skilled workers on aver-
age have occupations with a signi¯cantly higher content of interactive as well
as non-routine tasks. However, from Figures 1 and 2 it also becomes clear
that although high-skilled workers indeed tend to have occupations with higher
interactive and non-routine content than low-skilled workers, there is signi¯cant
heterogeneity within skill groups. Thus, while higher skills and non-routine and
more interactive tasks seem to be correlated, we can nevertheless identify low-
skilled manufacturing workers that occupy positions that are highly interactive
or non-routine and vice versa.
Among the low-skilled, a typical occupation characterized by low non-
routine content is \storekeeper, warehouse keeper" while \assemblers" is an
example of an occupation with low interactivity. \metalworkers," the largest
occupational group among low-skilled workers, score low in our interactivity
index but are in the medium range of our non-routine indicator. On the other
hand, \truck drivers" display a low intensity of non-routine tasks but have
10Note that this constitutes another departure from Spitz-Oener (2006), since in her formula, the
numerator consists of the number of tasks assigned to a given category. However, the rankings of
occupations with respect to task-intensity measures are not a®ected by the di®erent normalizations.
11The exact de¯nition of skills is provided in the next section.
9frequent interactions with co-workers or third parties.
\Technicians" are the largest occupational group among the medium-skilled.
They carry out a rather high proportion of both non-routine and interactive
tasks. Whereas \production foremen" even surpass them in both dimensions,
a typical occupation that displays considerably lower values is that of \o±ce
clerk".
\Engineers" make up by far the largest share among the high-skilled, fol-
lowed by \managers". Both occupations are characterized by high degrees of
non-routine and interactive tasks, which also explains the rather low standard
deviation of the task indices for the group of the high-skilled. However, there
is still heterogeneity. For example, \computer scientists" are characterized by
a high non-routine content but are less intensive in interactive tasks.
The question for the econometric analysis is now whether workers with
highly interactive or non-routine occupations are indeed di®erently a®ected by
increased o®shoring than their counterparts with occupations that have low
interactivity and are fairly routine. To answer this question, we follow two
identi¯cation strategies. The ¯rst is based on the assumption that workers'
wages are a®ected by o®shoring activity in the industry in which the worker is
employed, similar to, e.g., Feenstra and Hanson (1996), Geishecker and GÄ org
(2008) and Crinµ o (2010).
In order to implement this strategy, we merge our individual-level data
with industry-level o®shoring measures. O®shoring is constructed by combin-
ing input-output tables for imports provided by the German Federal Statistical
O±ce with commodity trade data from the Eurostat Comext database. We
follow a narrow concept of materials o®shoring by focusing on imported inter-
mediate inputs that correspond to a make-or-buy decision, that is, inputs that
in principle could be produced by the importing industry itself (see Feenstra
and Hanson, 1999). We consider this o®shoring measure to be more accurate
than relying solely on a±liate employment (as in, e.g., Ebenstein et al., 2009)
since i) a±liate employment also re°ects horizontal MNE activities and ii) not






with IMPj¤t denoting imported intermediate inputs from industry j¤ and Yjt
the production value of industry j at time t. ­jj¤t denotes the share of imports
from a foreign industry j¤ that is consumed by the respective domestic industry
j in t with
PJ
j=1 ­jj¤t£IMPj¤t =total imports from industry j¤ which are not
only used in manufacturing but also in agriculture, services, private and public
consumption, and investments and exports in t.12
Figure 3 depicts the weighted average o®shoring intensity in manufacturing
for the years 1991 to 2006. O®shoring intensity showed tremendous growth
during our sample period: between 1991 and 2006 it increased from 6 to 8
percent.
4 Empirical Model
To assess the wage impact of o®shoring conditional on observed and unobserved
heterogeneity, we estimate variants of the following Mincer wage equation:13















ºeOSjt £ EDUCeit £ TASKit
+ #jTRENDjt + ½R&D=Yjt + ¿j + ¹t + ¶i + ²ijt
where WAGEijt denotes individual i's hourly wage in industry j at time t.
Our controls include the standard variables in such wage regressions, see, for
example, Mincer (1974), Brown and Medo® (1989), Schmidt and Zimmermann
(1991). Descriptive statistics on all control variables are provided in Table 2.
12Note that the numerator in Equation 2 could also be derived directly from the main diagonal
of the input-output table. We chose, however, to only construct ­jj on the basis of input-output
tables and combine it with trade data to give less weight to potential measurement error of individual
input-output tables.
13Our empirical model builds on Geishecker and GÄ org (2008) but goes further by incorporating
heterogeneous tasks into the model.
11DEMOG denotes the demographic control variables for marital status, chil-
dren, and geographic region.14 The second set of control variables (WORK)
refers to workplace-related characteristics such as size and ¯rm ownership as
well as tenure.
We also control for time-changing observable industry characteristics (IND)
by including the size of the industry (measured in terms of output Y ) and
equipment and plant capital intensity (CapEqu;Plant=Y ).
To control for as much unobserved heterogeneity as possible, we make full
use of the three dimensions, i, j, and t, in our panel data and decompose the
error term into industry ¯xed e®ects ¿j, time ¯xed e®ects ¹t, individual ¯xed ef-
fects ¶i and a remaining error term ²ijt. In addition, the three panel dimensions
allow us to include a full set of industry-speci¯c time trends (TREND) that
capture industry-level technological change over and above common macroeco-
nomic trends accounted for by ¹t. In addition, we include research and develop-
ment intensity (R&D=Yj) as an input-based industry-level technology measure.
Particular attention is paid to educational controls based on the Inter-
national Standard Classi¯cation of Education (ISECD). EDUC contains ed-
ucational dummies for high education (e = High ¡ Skilled) and medium
(e = Medium ¡ Skilled) education; low education (e = Low ¡ Skilled) is
the omitted category.15
In addition, we control for the nature of job tasks of individuals by includ-
ing our constructed interactivity and non-routine indices, respectively. We do
this by interacting the respective task index with the educational attainment
dummies, thereby allowing for heterogeneous task e®ects across skill groups
(EDUC £ TASK). To account for the potentially heterogeneous impact of
o®shoring across skill groups and tasks, we interact o®shoring with the edu-
cational dummies (OS £ EDUC) and also include triple interaction terms for
o®shoring (OS £ EDUC £ TASK).
Accordingly, the marginal e®ect of o®shoring for the di®erent skill groups e
can be denoted as:
14We do not control for age as age together with individual ¯xed e®ects and time dummies would
result in perfect collinearity.
15Low-skilled workers are workers with second-stage basic education, lower secondary education,
or less. Medium-skilled workers have upper secondary education, post-secondary non-tertiary ed-
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We therefore allow for heterogeneous e®ects of o®shoring within skill groups
depending on the corresponding non-routine or interactivity index.
The combination of micro-level data and more aggregate o®shoring informa-
tion can overcome a number of problems that haunt pure industry-level studies.
First, due to the detailed information on educational attainment in our micro-
data, we can di®erentiate between skill groups in a much more precise way than
the commonly used manual/non-manual worker dichotomy (e.g., Feenstra and
Hanson 2001; Geishecker, 2006).
Second, since individual wages must have a substantially higher variance
than industry averages, potential endogeneity bias is considerably reduced, that
is, individual wages are unlikely to a®ect industry-level aggregates such as o®-
shoring (see Appendix 2). Nevertheless, we can also test for exogeneity of our
o®shoring measures using lagged values as instruments, and are unable to re-
ject the H0 of exogeneity within reasonable con¯dence bounds ( see Table A2
in Appendix 2).16
Third, combining micro-level wage information and industry-level o®shoring
data results in a three-dimensional data set that allows us to control for industry
technological progress by including industry-speci¯c time trends. Arguably in
our context, this is more general than to only include research and development
or technology measures, sometimes of poor quality, as most studies do (e.g.,
Berman, Bound and Machin, 1998, Feenstra and Hanson, 1996, 1999 ).
Combining micro-level and aggregate data can, however, give rise to contem-
poraneous correlation of the error terms ²ijt as demonstrated convincingly in,
e.g., Moulton (1986). As has become standard in the literature, we therefore cal-
culate cluster-robust standard errors applying the sandwich formula proposed in
White (1980) and Arellano (1987). However, this approach has its limitations
if the number of clusters is small relative to the number of observations per
cluster. In our application, we look at 21 industries, that is, 21 clusters, each
containing a fairly large number of individuals. In order to check how sensitive
16It may, of course, be problematic to use lagged values as instruments, since orthogonality
must frequently be rejected. However, in our application, one- and two-year lags are likely to be
orthogonal, as indicated by the low Hansen J statistic in Table A2.
13our results are to this type of cluster adjustment, we also apply a pairs-cluster
bootstrap-t procedure with 500 repetitions that, as demonstrated in Monte-
Carlo simulations reported by Cameron et al. (2008), yields considerably more
precise t-tests.
Furthermore, Autor and Handel (2009) stress the potential endogeneity of
individuals' tasks since workers may readily switch between di®erent sets of
tasks depending on associated wages. However, in contrast to Autor and Handel
(2009), we do not look at within-occupation task variations. In our approach,
every task intensity is linked precisely to one occupation. Arguably, we thereby
miss a potentially important source of within-occupation wage di®erentials.
However, individuals rarely change occupation and when they do they are more
likely to choose occupations with a similar task content (see Gathmann and
SchÄ onberg, 2010) in order to minimize task-speci¯c human capital losses. In
our sample, only 445 occupation changes (of 13,189 observations) take place
between 1991 and 2006. We therefore consider simultaneity between wages and
tasks to be of lesser concern when looking at task-speci¯c o®shoring e®ects.17
5 Partial Equilibrium Results
We estimate various speci¯cations of Equation 6 for di®erent task groupings.
The main estimation results are presented in Table 3 for the interactivity task
index and Table 4 for the non-routine task index following the methodology
proposed by Becker et al. (2009).
In the present analysis, we are of course mainly interested in the e®ects of
o®shoring and merely control for any observable and unobservable heterogene-
ity that may otherwise bias our results. Regarding the standard demographic
and workplace-related control variables, coe±cients are identi¯ed through time
variation and generally have the expected sign and magnitude but, conditional
on our comprehensive unobserved heterogeneity controls, often cannot be esti-
mated with su±cient precision.
Note that pairs-cluster bootstrapped t-statistics performed for the speci¯ca-
tions reported in Column (c) of Tables 3 and 4 always con¯rm the conventional
cluster-robust t-tests or even point to statistical signi¯cance when conventional
17The importance of unobserved characteristics for determining initial occupational choices is
taken into account in our model through the inclusion of individual ¯xed e®ects.
14t-statistics do not. Thus, in our application, the number of clusters (industries)
seems large enough to avoid the serious over-rejection problems discussed by
various authors and summarized in Cameron et al. (2008).
Focusing on statistically signi¯cant coe±cients according to our pairs-cluster
bootstrapped t-statistics in Tables 3 and 4 (Column IV), we ¯nd, ceteris paribus,
that workers who change into ¯rms with 20 to 199 and 200 to 2,000 employees
experience wage cuts of four and two percent, respectively, compared to ¯rms
with more than 2,000 employees, our default category.18
Regarding tenure, we have to reject non-linearity and ¯nd a weakly statisti-
cally signi¯cant but rather small positive e®ect. Ceteris paribus, each additional
year of tenure generates an average wage premium of 0.3 percent. However,
overall work experience in full-time employment plays a much more important
role. The coe±cients on full-time work experience in levels and squared are
jointly statistically signi¯cant19 and have opposite signs, suggesting a concave
relationship between hourly wages and work experience. While initially every
additional year of full-time work experience raises hourly wages by about two
percent, the e®ect becomes smaller as work experience increases, and from 26
years of work experience onwards, actually turns negative. For part-time work
experience, however, we ¯nd no statistically signi¯cant e®ects.
In addition, we ¯nd recent unemployment spells to play a signi¯cant penaliz-
ing role for wages over and above work experience and unobserved time-constant
individual characteristics. Individuals who experienced an unemployment spell
during the year preceding the interview month experienced hourly wage cuts
of 15 percent when re-entering employment. Whether this wage penalty of
unemployment experience works through, for instance, actual human capital
deterioration or is the result of labor market signaling is beyond the scope of
the present analysis.
Regarding educational attainment, we cannot identify any wage e®ects with
su±cient precision. However, in a speci¯cation with individual ¯xed e®ects,
this is what one would expect, as few individuals switch between skill groups.
Similarly, we ¯nd only a weakly signi¯cant direct wage e®ect with respect
to the interactivity-based task index when interacted with medium skills, and
18The e®ect is also identi¯ed through individuals who stay in ¯rms that grow and switch between
categories.
19F-test for interactivity based regression: F=7.14, p=0.00. F-test for non-routine content based
regression: F=7.53, p=0.00.
15no statistically signi¯cant direct wage e®ects with respect to the non-routine
content of tasks. Again, this is likely due to the fact that individuals rarely
change between di®erent types of tasks.20
Regarding time-changing industry-level control variables other than o®-
shoring, coe±cients generally cannot be identi¯ed with su±cient precision after
we control for individual and industry ¯xed e®ects and industry-speci¯c time
trends.21 The exception is the coe±cient on industry research and development
intensity (R&D=Y ). While we ¯nd increases in research and development in-
tensity to reduce hourly wages for all skill groups, the e®ect is only weakly sta-
tistically signi¯cant for high-skilled workers. A one percentage point increase
in R&D=Y lowers wages for high-skilled workers by about two percent. How-
ever, over the sample period R&D=Y averaged over all industries has remained
nearly constant so that the e®ect of technological progress is economically neg-
ligible. Note, however, that R&D=Y is only one component of our controls for
technological change and is complemented by a full set of year dummies as well
as industry-speci¯c time trends.
Conditional on our large set of controls for observed and unobserved het-
erogeneity, we can now look at the o®shoring coe±cients and their respective
interaction terms. As expected, the e®ects of o®shoring are fairly heterogeneous
depending on individual skills but are also shaped by the ease with which dif-
ferent tasks can be o®shored. To see this, however, one cannot rely solely on
Tables 3 and 4.
Equation 4 denotes the marginal e®ects of o®shoring for the di®erent skill
groups. Accordingly, the speci¯c wage impact of o®shoring can only be evalu-
ated at some value of the interactivity or non-routine task index. Furthermore,
what matters for the statistical signi¯cance of o®shoring for the di®erent skill
groups e is the joint signi¯cance of the coe±cients ¸e and ºe, i.e., the coe±cients
of skill-interacted o®shoring (OSjt£EDUCeit) and the triple interaction terms
of skill, task index, and o®shoring (OSjt £ EDUCeit £ TASKit). However,
rather than focusing on statistical signi¯cance, what we are really interested
in is economic signi¯cance, i.e., how much wages changed due to increased o®-
20Nevertheless, as educational attainment and task intensity are part of our interaction terms, it
is essential to also include them in a non-interacted way.
21Industry ¯xed e®ects are not perfectly collinear with individual ¯xed e®ects, since individuals
can change industry. For these cases, industry ¯xed e®ects control for level di®erences in our
time-changing industry variables such as output or o®shoring.
16shoring. Obviously, this information is not contained in standard regression
output.
To ease interpretation of the coe±cients and to illustrate economic signi¯-
cance of o®shoring for various skill and task interactions, we engage in a thought
experiment and ask how much hourly wages would have increased or decreased
had o®shoring remained constant at its 1991 value.22 We do this separately for
low-, medium-, and high-skilled workers, and further distinguish between the
types of tasks within skill groups by looking at the 10th, 50th, and 90th per-
centiles of the respective interactivity and non-routine content of tasks. Table 6
presents the outcome of this exercise for our interactivity and non-routine con-
tent task classi¯cation, respectively. Bold ¯gures represent simulations where
coe±cients on the skill-interacted o®shoring measures and the triple interaction
terms are jointly statistically signi¯cant.
Focusing ¯rst on low-skilled workers, variables and interaction terms that
relate to o®shoring are found to be jointly statistically signi¯cant for the inter-
activity as well as the non-routine content task classi¯cation. However, in line
with the reasoning of Leamer and Storper (2001), Levy and Murnane (2004),
and Blinder (2006), the e®ect of o®shoring is heterogeneous within the group
of low-skilled workers and indeed depends on the ease with which tasks can be
o®shored.
Applying the interactivity-based task classi¯cation, we ¯nd that had o®-
shoring remained constant at its 1991 value, low-skilled workers in the lowest
tenth percentile of interactivity, ceteris paribus, would have earned 32 euro
cents (i.e., 2.17 percent of 1991 average low-skilled wages) more per hour in
2006 than they actually did. Low-skilled workers in the 50th percentile, how-
ever, only incur wage cuts of 10 euro cents, or 0.66 percent, while low-skilled
workers in the 90th percentile experience small wage increases of 10 euro cents,
or 0.65 percent.
When instead classifying o®shorability along the lines of non-routine con-
tents of tasks, we ¯nd very similar e®ects. Taken together, the cumulative e®ect
of increased o®shoring is a 26 euro cent (1.73 percent) reduction in hourly wages
for low-skilled workers with the lowest content of non-routine tasks. Low-skilled
workers in the 50th percentile of non-routine content only experience wage cuts
22Note that to do so we assume that changes in o®shoring intensity are essentially marginal.
17of 12 euro cents (0.82 percent), while workers in the 90th percentile gain 15
euro cents (1.04 percent).
Clearly, these partial equilibrium e®ects seem fairly small at ¯rst glance. To
signify the size of the e®ects, assuming 1,500 work hours per year, o®shoring
accounts for a 390 to 480 euro reduction in yearly gross wages (in constant 2000
prices) for low-skilled workers whose tasks are most easily o®shored. However,
low-skilled workers whose tasks are most di±cult to o®shore, that is, workers
whose tasks are most interactive or have the highest non-routine content, are
only positively a®ected by industry o®shoring. Due to o®shoring, their gross
yearly income (in constant 2000 prices) increases by between 150 and 225 eu-
ros.23
For medium-skilled workers, coe±cients are only estimated with su±cient
precision when applying the interactivity-based task classi¯cation. Again, the
partial equilibrium e®ects of o®shoring follow a similar pattern as for low-skilled
workers. Medium-skilled workers with the lowest degree of interactivity experi-
ence cumulative wage cuts of 38 euro cents (2.23 percent), while medium-skilled
workers at the 50th and 90th percentile experience cumulative wage gains of 7
and 27 euro cents, respectively. For high-skilled workers, however, statistical
signi¯cance has to be generally rejected.
To test for the robustness of our ¯ndings with respect to an alternative clas-
si¯cation of tasks, we proceed by employing the methodology based on Spitz-
Oener (2006), which is discussed in more detail in Section 3. For completeness,
coe±cient estimates of our main speci¯cation containing all interaction terms
are reported in Table 5 for interactive and non-routine task indices, respec-
tively. When looking at the F-tests for joint economic signi¯cance of our in-
teraction terms and the respective economic signi¯cance calculations reported
at the bottom of Table 6, it becomes clear that the e®ects of o®shoring are
identi¯ed with considerably less precision when applying this alternative task
classi¯cation scheme. However, at least for low-skilled workers, there are some
striking similarities across the di®erent task classi¯cation schemes. Following
the methodology based on Spitz-Oener (2006), we ¯nd that low-skilled work-
ers who carry out tasks with the lowest degree of interactivity and the lowest
23Accordingly, our results also imply that task-speci¯c o®shoring e®ects are one potential source
of the recent increase in wage inequality within skill groups that has been documented in, for
example, Dustmann et al. (2009) and Antonczyk et al. (2009).
18non-routine content experience cumulative wage cuts of 17 and 19 euro cents,
respectively. Low-skilled workers in the 50th percentile of interactivity and non-
routine content, however, only experience wage cuts of 13 and 11 euro cents,
respectively. At the same time, we ¯nd low-skilled workers in the 90th percentile
of interactivity and non-routine content to gain 3 and 5 euro cents respectively.
These e®ects are, however, only at the border of conventional statistical signif-
icance when looking at the interactivity of tasks and only weakly statistically
signi¯cant when focusing on the non-routine content of tasks.
6 Results with worker mobility across indus-
tries
We proceed by explicitly dropping the assumption that workers are immobile
between industries, that is, we want to look at the e®ects of o®shoring that
are more closely related to the general equilibrium. As already discussed in
Section 1, in general equilibrium, individual i's wages are not only determined
by o®shoring activity in the industry j in which i is employed, but also by
o®shoring activities in other industries l 2 J, insofar as these activities a®ect
the overall demand for labor that individual i faces. What is important is
that no actual movement of workers is required to generate these cross-industry
e®ects; the potential for movement su±ces.
One way of approximating these wage e®ects of o®shoring is to use
occupation-speci¯c measures of o®shoring. Thus, we allow for cross-industry
e®ects of o®shoring by making the identifying assumption that workers are re-
luctant or unable to change occupation but readily switch between industries.
In order to implement this, we build on Ebenstein et al. (2009) and construct
occupation-speci¯c o®shoring by re-weighting industry-level o®shoring measures
(cf. Equation 2) with respect to industry employment within a given occupation







Accordingly, we re-estimate Equation 6 substituting OSjt for OSkt.












ºeOSkt £ EDUCeit £ TASKit
+ #kTRENDkt + ½R&D=Ykt + ¿k + ¹t + ¶i + ²ikt
where WAGEikt denotes individual i's hourly wage in occupation k at time
t.
Note that we now have 61 clusters (occupations) instead of 21 (industries)
in the partial equilibrium analysis. Thus, we consider standard cluster robust
standard errors and corresponding t-tests to su±ce and do not construct pairs
cluster bootstrapped t-statistics as before. Furthermore, we now control for
occupation-speci¯c observable characteristics by including occupation-speci¯c
output, capital, and R&D measures that are constructed applying the same
methodology as in Equation 5. In addition, to further control for occupation-
speci¯c technological change, the model also contains occupation-speci¯c time
trends TRENDkt. Occupation speci¯c unobservable characteristics are cap-
tured by a full set of occupation dummies ¿k. Since each occupation corresponds
to exactly one time constant task intensity in our data, we have perfect collinear-
ity between the two variable sets. Accordingly, our occupation dummies also
capture the respective interactivity and non-routine content of associated tasks.
Tables 7 and 8 report the parameter estimates applying the task classi¯ca-
tion scheme of Becker et al. (2009). Regarding our standard control variables,
coe±cients are very similar to the ones in Tables 3, 4 and 5. However, when
applying the occupation-speci¯c measure from Equation 5 we ¯nd a much more
pronounced e®ect of o®shoring. Similar to the partial equilibrium case, we ease
interpretation of our o®shoring-related coe±cients by looking at the joint sig-
ni¯cance of the respective interaction terms and by calculating the economic
signi¯cance of occupation-speci¯c o®shoring for each skill group at selected ref-
erence points for the degree of interactivity and non-routine content.
As is reported in Table 10, we ¯nd strong occupation-speci¯c o®shoring ef-
fects for low- and medium-skilled workers that vary signi¯cantly across di®erent
20degrees of interactivity or non-routine content of tasks.
Low-skilled workers in the 10th percentile of interactivity experience cumu-
lated wage cuts of 1.31 euros (8.85 percent) per hour. For low-skilled workers
in the 50th percentile of interactivity, this cumulated wage cut is 0.77 euros
while low-skilled workers with the highest degree of interactivity only experi-
ence wage cuts of 0.29 euros. These wage e®ects are substantial and considerably
larger than in the partial equilibrium case. Assuming 1,500 yearly work hours,
low-skilled workers earn between 435 and 1,965 euros less due to o®shoring
depending on the degree of interactivity of the tasks they perform.
A similar pattern can be observed for medium-skilled workers. The cumula-
tive wage cut due to o®shoring is highest for workers in the lowest interactivity
decile (1.64 euros) and becomes less severe the higher the degree of interac-
tivity becomes (0.73 euros for the top decile). Again assuming 1,500 yearly
work hours, we can calculate a cumulative wage reduction of 2,460 euros for
medium-skilled workers in the lowest interactivity decile, 1,515 euros for the
median interactivity degree, and 1,095 euro for the top interactivity decile.
Interestingly, these ¯gures are robust irrespective of which task classi¯cation
scheme is applied. When applying the task classi¯cation scheme by Becker et al.
(2009) but looking at the non-routine content of tasks instead of interactivity,
we ¯nd very similar wage e®ects. Low-skilled workers in the bottom decile
of non-routine content experience a cumulative hourly wage reduction of 1.06
euros, which is much more severe than the wage cut for low-skilled workers
with tasks having a median non-routine content (0.83 euros) or a non-routine
content in the top decile (0.35 euros). Again, for medium-skilled workers, the
pattern looks similar. Here the cumulative hourly wage reduction ranges from
1.23 euros for the bottom non-routine decile to 0.72 euros in the top decile.
Furthermore, when applying a task classi¯cation scheme that builds on
Spitz-Oener (2006) (see Table 9 for coe±cient estimates), cumulative wage ef-
fects of o®shoring are again very similar. For low-skilled workers, these wage
cuts due to o®shoring range between 1.06 euros per hour for the bottom decile of
interactivity and 0.09 euros for the top decile. Applying this task classi¯cation
scheme to medium-skilled workers, we ¯nd a cumulative hourly wage reduction
of 1.56 euros for workers in the bottom decile of interactivity and 0.79 euros for
workers with median interactivity. Medium-skilled workers at the top decile of
21interactivity, however, actually gain from o®shoring: their hourly wages cumu-
latively increased by 0.20 euros. When focusing on the non-routine content of
tasks, we ¯nd medium-skilled workers to experience wage cuts ranging between
1.63 euros and 0.08 euros depending on the degree of non-routine content.
Thus, in line with the argument put forward in, for example, Blinder (2006),
a higher degree of interactivity or non-routine content can indeed shield against
the negative wage impact of o®shoring. However in the context of the model
proposed by Grossman and Rossi-Hansberg (2008), the wage-reducing labor
supply and terms-of-trade e®ects in most cases appear to dominate the positive
productivity e®ect of o®shoring for low- and medium-skilled workers in our data.
What is striking is the magnitude of the e®ects. While in partial equilibrium
o®shoring only modestly a®ects wages, albeit in an interesting task-speci¯c way,
the wage impact of o®shoring is substantial once we allow for worker mobility
and, thus, cross-industry spillovers.
7 Conclusion
The paper analyses the e®ects of o®shoring on individual-level wages, taking
into account the ease with which individuals' tasks can be o®shored. Our anal-
ysis relates to contributions such as Blinder (2006), Levy and Murnane (2004),
and Leamer and Storper (2001), who postulate that there is only a loose rela-
tionship between the suitability of a task for o®shoring and the associated skill
level. Instead, these authors stress that the degree of o®shorability depends on
the relative importance of routine versus non-routine tasks and on the extent
to which personal interaction is needed on the job.
For the empirical analysis we combine individual-level data and industry-
level o®shoring measures and classify tasks according to their degree of interac-
tivity and non-routine content, applying two alternative classi¯cation schemes
that build on Spitz-Oener (2006) and Becker et al. (2009). By studying the
e®ects of industry-level o®shoring at the individual level we can control for a
host of observable and unobservable individual characteristics, thereby avoiding
aggregation and reducing potential endogeneity bias. The main contribution of
the paper is, however, that by using micro-level data we can investigate the
interaction between tasks and skills; thus, we can identify task-speci¯c wage
e®ects of o®shoring within as well as between the groups of high-, medium-,
22and low-skilled workers.
In line with earlier research, we ¯nd the partial equilibrium impact of o®-
shoring on individual wages to be rather modest and to vary according to in-
dividual skills. However, our empirical results also indicate that the partial
equilibrium wage e®ects o®shoring are heterogeneous within skill groups de-
pending on the degree of interactivity or non-routine content of the respective
tasks of workers.
When looking at the e®ects of o®shoring in a situation that more closely cor-
responds to the general equilibrium, that is, when allowing for worker mobility
between industries, we ¯nd substantial negative wage e®ects of o®shoring for
low- and medium-skilled workers. Furthermore, the magnitude of these e®ects
strongly depends on the type of tasks workers perform. For instance, for low-
skilled workers carrying out tasks with the lowest degree of interactivity (which,
arguably, are also the tasks that can most easily be o®shored), increased o®-
shoring between 1991 and 2006 accounts for a cumulative yearly wage reduction
of 1,965 euros. For low-skilled workers with the highest degree of interactivity,
o®shoring can only explain a yearly wage reduction of 435 euros. Accordingly,
when studying the labor market e®ects of o®shoring, we argue that the tradi-
tionally proposed skill-wage pattern needs to be altered by taking the varying
degree of o®shorability of tasks within skill groups into account.
Figures and Tables
Table 1: Description of Task Indices
All High-Skilled Medium-Skilled Low-Skilled
Interactivity Index
Mean 0.362 0.491 0.401 0.323
Standard Deviation 0.146 0.092 0.136 0.138
Mean Comparison Test H0 : ¹High = ¹Medium H0 : ¹Medium = ¹Low
p=0.000 p=0.000
Non-Routine Index
Mean 0.500 0.797 0.572 0.413
Standard Deviation 0.237 0.173 0.221 0.187
Mean Comparison Test H0 : ¹High = ¹Medium H0 : ¹Medium = ¹Low
p=0.000 p=0.000
Observations 13189 2080 2156 8953
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25Table 2: Descriptive Statistics of Remaining Variables
Mean Standard Deviation
Hourly Wage in Euro 17.4478 8.1588
D:Married 0.7537 0.4309
D: Has Children 0.5644 0.4959
D: FirmSize < 20 0.0116 0.1071
D: FirmSize20 ¡ 199 0.0941 0.2920
D: FirmSize200 ¡ 1999 0.2745 0.4463
D: Public Firm 0.0084 0.0914
D: Firm Owner not reported 0.0105 0.1021
Tenure in years 11.8784 9.2638
Work Experience Full-time in years 18.1637 10.2259
Work Experience Part-time in years 0.2098 1.0242
D: Recent Unemployment 0.0178 0.1323
D: ISCED High-Skilled 0.1577 0.3645
D: ISCED Medium-Skilled 0.1635 0.3698
Production Value Y in Bill. Euro 99.5723 55.4327
R&D=Y in percent 2.3359 2.4613
CapEqu=Y in percent 54.5770 15.1807
CapPlant=Y in percent 30.7821 12.5249
Observations 13189
26Table 3: Industry-Level O®shoring: Interactive Tasks, Becker et al. (2009)-
Classi¯cation
(a) (b) (c) Pairs-Cluster
Bootstrapped-t
Dependent variable: Log hourly wage
D:Married 0.0186 0.0205 0.0207
[0.0155] [0.0152] [0.0148]
D: Has Children 0.0083 0.0077 0.0081
[0.0095] [0.0094] [0.0095]
D: FirmSize < 20 0.0011 0.0039 0.0043
[0.0365] [0.0359] [0.0363]
D: FirmSize20 ¡ 199 -0.0416 -0.0423 -0.0422
[0.0232]* [0.0233]* [0.0228]* **
D: FirmSize200 ¡ 1999 -0.0155 -0.0155 -0.0154
[0.0153] [0.0147] [0.0145] **
D: Public Firm 0.002 0.0011 0.0005
[0.0418] [0.0419] [0.0419]
D: Firm Owner not reported 0.0013 -0.0002 -0.0021
[0.0516] [0.0522] [0.0525]
Tenure 0.0038 0.0036 0.0033
[0.0023] [0.0023] [0.0023] *
WorkExperienceFulltime 0.0171 0.016 0.0156
[0.0187] [0.0182] [0.0181]
WorkExperienceFull ¡ time2 -0.0003 -0.0003 -0.0003
[0.0001]*** [0.0001]*** [0.0001]*** ***
WorkExperiencePart ¡ time 0.0261 0.0282 0.0281
[0.0413] [0.0410] [0.0399]
WorkExperiencePart ¡ time2 -0.0067 -0.0068 -0.0068
[0.0091] [0.0092] [0.0089]
D: Recent Unemployment -0.1568 -0.1592 -0.1595
[0.0299]*** [0.0299]*** [0.0297]*** ***
D: ISCED High-Skilled 0.0438 0.1795 -0.0466
[0.0304] [0.1553] [0.2246]
D: ISCED Medium-Skilled 0.0582 0.1111 0.1199
[0.0304]* [0.0570]* [0.0713] *
Task: Interactivity Index 0.009
[0.0984]
Task: InteractivityIndex £ High ¡ Skilled -0.1766 0.1529
[0.2949] [0.4097]
Task: InteractivityIndex £ Medium ¡ Skilled -0.0863 -0.2704
[0.0869] [0.1067]** ***




(a) (b) (c) Pairs-Cluster
Bootstrapped-t




R&D=Y £ High ¡ Skilled -0.0176 -0.0169
[0.0089]* [0.0088]* *
R&D=Y £ Medium ¡ Skilled -0.0078 -0.0047
[0.0082] [0.0090]
R&D=Y £ Low ¡ Skilled -0.0098 -0.0089
[0.0079] [0.0078]
CapEqu=Y 0.0007 0.0007 0.0002
[0.0021] [0.0022] [0.0024]




OS £ High ¡ Skilled -0.0003 0.02
[0.0035] [0.0185]
OS £ Medium ¡ Skilled 0.0006 -0.0181
[0.0041] [0.0112]
OS £ Low ¡ Skilled -0.0022 -0.0146
[0.0025] [0.0056]** ***
OS £ Task Index £ High ¡ Skilled -0.041
[0.0360]
OS £ Task Index £ Medium ¡ Skilled 0.0451
[0.0213]** **
OS £ Task Index £ Low ¡ Skilled 0.0334
[0.0121]** ***
Constant 32.1064 29.2401 33.1992
[45.2464] [44.9509] [45.4426]
Observations 13189 13189 13189
R2 0.82 0.82 0.82
Note: *, **, signi¯cant at 10%, 5% error probability.
Default categories: D: Age 18-24, D: FirmSize >= 2000, D: ISCED Low-Skilled.
All speci¯cations contain individual ¯xed e®ects and full dummy sets for federal state,
time and industry as well as industry speci¯c linear time trends.
Inverse sample probability weighted regression with cluster-robust standard errors.
28Table 4: Industry-Level O®shoring: Non-Routine Tasks, Becker et al. (2009)-
Classi¯cation
(a) (b) (c) Pairs-Cluster
Bootstrapped-t
Dependent variable: Log hourly wage
D:Married 0.0184 0.0199 0.0211
[0.0157] [0.0150] [0.0148]
D: Has Children 0.0083 0.008 0.0073
[0.0094] [0.0093] [0.0094]
D: FirmSize < 20 0.0009 0.0055 0.0035
[0.0370] [0.0353] [0.0360]
D: FirmSize20 ¡ 199 -0.0413 -0.04 -0.042
[0.0226]* [0.0221]* [0.0220]* ***
D: FirmSize200 ¡ 1999 -0.0152 -0.0147 -0.0156
[0.0153] [0.0146] [0.0146] *
D: Public Firm 0.0021 0.0026 0.0023
[0.0417] [0.0427] [0.0429]
D: Firm Owner not reported 0.0015 -0.0008 -0.0001
[0.0520] [0.0526] [0.0533]
Tenure 0.0038 0.0037 0.0035
[0.0023] [0.0024] [0.0024] *
WorkExperienceFulltime 0.0174 0.0173 0.0162
[0.0179] [0.0179] [0.0176]
WorkExperienceFull ¡ time2 -0.0003 -0.0003 -0.0003
[0.0001]*** [0.0001]*** [0.0001]*** ***
WorkExperiencePart ¡ time 0.0264 0.029 0.0307
[0.0409] [0.0409] [0.0406]
WorkExperiencePart ¡ time2 -0.0067 -0.0069 -0.0071
[0.0091] [0.0091] [0.0090]
D: Recent Unemployment -0.1567 -0.1569 -0.1563
[0.0292]*** [0.0294]*** [0.0288]*** ***
D: ISCED High-Skilled 0.0435 0.1189 0.2452
[0.0297] [0.1380] [0.1661]
D: ISCED Medium-Skilled 0.058 0.1099 0.0807
[0.0302]* [0.0689] [0.1004]
Task: Interactivity Index 0.0187
[0.0710]
Task: InteractivityIndex £ High ¡ Skilled -0.0444 -0.2693
[0.1420] [0.1972]
Task: InteractivityIndex £ Medium ¡ Skilled -0.0787 -0.1192
[0.1344] [0.1708]




(a) (b) (c) Pairs-Cluster
Bootstrapped-t




R&D=Y £ High ¡ Skilled -0.0176 -0.0173
[0.0087]* [0.0083]* *
R&D=Y £ Medium ¡ Skilled -0.0079 -0.0068
[0.0079] [0.0082]
R&D=Y £ Low ¡ Skilled -0.0093 -0.0083
[0.0078] [0.0077]
CapEqu=Y 0.0007 0.0007 0.0005
[0.0022] [0.0022] [0.0022]




OS £ High ¡ Skilled -0.0003 -0.0222
[0.0035] [0.0135] **
OS £ Medium ¡ Skilled 0.0008 -0.0033
[0.0039] [0.0082]
OS £ Low ¡ Skilled -0.0023 -0.0117
[0.0025] [0.0035]*** ***
OS £ Task Index £ High ¡ Skilled 0.0286
[0.0184] **
OS £ Task Index £ Medium ¡ Skilled 0.0076
[0.0100]
OS £ Task Index £ Low ¡ Skilled 0.0215
[0.0067]*** ***
Constant 32.5901 30.7816 34.3588
[44.2775] [43.8242] [43.7532] ***
Observations 13189 13189 13189
R2 0.82 0.82 0.82
Note: *, **, signi¯cant at 10%, 5% error probability.
Default categories: D: Age 18-24, D: FirmSize >= 2000, D: ISCED Low-Skilled.
All speci¯cations contain individual ¯xed e®ects and full dummy sets for federal state,
time and industry as well as industry speci¯c linear time trends.
Inverse sample probability weighted regression with cluster-robust standard errors.
30Table 5: Industry-Level O®shoring: Classi¯cation based on Spitz-Oener (2006)
(a) Pairs-Cluster (b) Pairs-Cluster
Bootstrapped-t Bootstrapped-t
Interactive Non-Routine
Dependent variable: Log hourly wage
D:Married 0.0187 0.019
[0.0147] [0.0146]
D: Has Children 0.007 0.0072
[0.0093] [0.0092]
D: FirmSize < 20 0.0029 0.0027
[0.0369] [0.0370]
D: FirmSize20 ¡ 199 -0.0415 -0.0417
[0.0220]* ** [0.0221]* **
D: FirmSize200 ¡ 1999 -0.0153 -0.0155
[0.0140] * [0.0139] **
D: Public Firm 0.0016 0.0014
[0.0420] [0.0420]
D: Firm Owner not reported 0.0003 0.0003
[0.0528] [0.0529]
Tenure 0.0035 0.0034
[0.0023] * [0.0023] *
WorkExperienceFulltime 0.0162 0.0161
[0.0176] [0.0175]
WorkExperienceFull ¡ time2 -0.0003 -0.0003
[0.0001]*** *** [0.0001]*** ***
WorkExperiencePart ¡ time 0.0295 0.0296
[0.0398] [0.0397]
WorkExperiencePart ¡ time2 -0.0071 -0.007
[0.0090] [0.0090]
D: Recent Unemployment -0.1568 -0.1564
[0.0284]*** *** [0.0282]*** ***
D: ISCED High-Skilled 0.0874 0.1185
[0.1555] [0.1892]
D: ISCED Medium-Skilled 0.052 0.0667
[0.0603] [0.0752]
Task: InteractivityIndex £ High ¡ Skilled 0.0042 -0.0328
[0.2230] [0.2432]
Task: InteractivityIndex £ Medium ¡ Skilled 0.0051 -0.0175
[0.1305] [0.1387]




(a) Pairs-Cluster (b) Pairs-Cluster
Bootstrapped-t Bootstrapped-t
Interactive Non-Routine
Production Value Y -0.0005 -0.0005
[0.0007] [0.0007]
R&D=Y £ High ¡ Skilled -0.0169 -0.0165
[0.0087]* * [0.0086]* *
R&D=Y £ Medium ¡ Skilled -0.0076 -0.0072
[0.0079] [0.0079]






OS £ High ¡ Skilled -0.0028 -0.0077
[0.0063] [0.0082]
OS £ Medium ¡ Skilled -0.0024 -0.0046
[0.0076] [0.0090]
OS £ Low ¡ Skilled -0.0067 -0.0083
[0.0040] [0.0044]* *
OS £ Task Index £ High ¡ Skilled 0.0043 0.0107
[0.0117] [0.0136]
OS £ Task Index £ Medium ¡ Skilled 0.0083 0.0111
[0.0133] [0.0138]
OS £ Task Index £ Low ¡ Skilled 0.0146 0.0158





Note: *, **, signi¯cant at 10%, 5% error probability.
Default categories: D: Age 18-24, D: FirmSize >= 2000, D: ISCED Low-Skilled.
All speci¯cations contain individual ¯xed e®ects and full dummy sets for federal state,
time and industry as well as industry speci¯c linear time trends.
Inverse sample probability weighted regression with cluster-robust standard errors.
32Table 6: Industry-Level O®shoring: Economic Signi¯cance Calculations
Average Hourly Wage 1991 Low-Skilled Medium Skilled High-Skilled
in Euro 14.85 16.81 26.40
Task Classi¯cation following Becker et al. (2009)
Interactive Tasks
Joint Signi¯cance of OS F=3.87 F=3.20 F=0.66
p= 0.0380 p=0.0624 p=0.5254
Cumulated OS e®ect 1991-2006 in Euro in percent in Euro in percent in Euro in percent
Interactive 10th percentile -0.32 -2.17 -0.38 -2.23 0.15 0.57
Interactive 50th percentile -0.10 -0.66 0.07 0.41 -0.09 -0.33
Interactive 90th percentile 0.10 0.65 0.27 1.58 -0.16 -0.60
Non-Routine Tasks
Joint Signi¯cance of OS F=6.57 F=0.44 F=1.40
p=0.0064 p=0.6525 p=0.2693
Cumulated OS e®ect 1991-2006 in Euro in percent in Euro in Euro
Non-Routine 10th percentile -0.26 -1.73 -0.05 -0.29 -0.32 -1.20
Non-Routine 50th percentile -0.12 -0.82 0.04 0.21 0.15 0.58
Non-Routine 90th percentile 0.15 1.04 0.15 0.89 0.32 1.23
Task Classi¯cation based on Spitz-Oener (2006)
Interactive Tasks
Joint Signi¯cance of OS F=2.23 F=0.34 F=0.10
p=0.1332 p=0.7136 p= 0.9087
Cumulated OS e®ect 1991-2006 in Euro in percent in Euro in percent in Euro in percent
Interactive 10th percentile -0.17 -1.15 -0.05 -0.32 -0.04 -0.16
Interactive 50th percentile -0.13 -0.90 0.05 0.30 -0.01 -0.02
Interactive 90th percentile 0.03 0.18 0.18 1.08 0.06 0.22
Non-Routine Tasks
Joint Signi¯cance of OS F= 2.85 F=0.50 F=0.48
p= 0.0814 p=0.6143 p=0.6243
Cumulated OS e®ect 1991-2006 in Euro in percent in Euro in percent in Euro in percent
Non-Routine 10th percentile -0.19 -1.29 -0.10 -0.59 -0.06 -0.21
Non-Routine 50th percentile -0.11 -0.77 0.06 0.36 0.01 0.04
Non-Routine 90th percentile 0.05 0.37 0.20 1.21 0.13 0.50
Note: Bold ¯gures correspond to jointly signi¯cant o®shoring/interaction terms.
33Table 7: Occupation-Speci¯c O®shoring: Interactive Tasks, Becker et al. (2009)-
Classi¯cation
(a) (b) (c)
Dependent variable: Log hourly wage
D:Married 0.0224 0.0217 0.0223
[0.0154] [0.0156] [0.0155]
D: Has Children 0.0081 0.008 0.0071
[0.0117] [0.0118] [0.0121]
D: FirmSize < 20 -0.0133 -0.0129 -0.0141
[0.0398] [0.0404] [0.0406]
D: FirmSize20 ¡ 199 -0.0573 -0.0572 -0.0584
[0.0330]* [0.0331]* [0.0330]*
D: FirmSize200 ¡ 1999 -0.0146 -0.0153 -0.0146
[0.0137] [0.0136] [0.0134]
D: Public Firm 0.001 0.0019 0.0006
[0.0408] [0.0419] [0.0420]
D: Firm Owner not reported 0.0217 0.0215 0.0227
[0.0581] [0.0581] [0.0576]
Tenure 0.0015 0.0016 0.0014
[0.0020] [0.0019] [0.0019]
WorkExperienceFulltime 0.0233 0.0238 0.0238
[0.0183] [0.0183] [0.0181]
WorkExperienceFull ¡ time2 -0.0003 -0.0003 -0.0003
[0.0001]*** [0.0001]*** [0.0001]***
WorkExperiencePart ¡ time 0.025 0.0266 0.0261
[0.0597] [0.0606] [0.0609]
WorkExperiencePart ¡ time2 -0.0083 -0.0085 -0.0081
[0.0087] [0.0089] [0.0088]
D: Recent Unemployment -0.1615 -0.1614 -0.1632
[0.0278]*** [0.0277]*** [0.0275]***
D: ISCED High-Skilled 0.0571 0.0759 0.0279
[0.0436] [0.0973] [0.0776]









R&D=Y £ High ¡ Skilled -2.5036 -0.2967
[2.9936] [3.2035]
R&D=Y £ Medium ¡ Skilled 0.3412 0.9456
[2.6313] [2.7934]
R&D=Y £ Low ¡ Skilled -1.8342 -1.6931
[2.2279] [2.3887]
CapEqu=Y 0.1013 0.1147 -0.039
[0.4286] [0.4278] [0.4853]




OS £ High ¡ Skilled -0.0193 0.0117
[0.0093]** [0.0242]
OS £ Medium ¡ Skilled -0.0282 -0.0553
[0.0081]*** [0.0193]***
OS £ Low ¡ Skilled -0.0193 -0.0517
[0.0062]*** [0.0145]***
OS £ Task Index £ High ¡ Skilled -0.0522
[0.0471]
OS £ Task Index £ Medium ¡ Skilled 0.0639
[0.0438]
OS £ Task Index £ Low ¡ Skilled 0.0818
[0.0365]**
Constant 122.7105 124.3848 120.6054
[36.1652]*** [36.5883]*** [36.0719]***
Observations 13189 13189 13189
R2 0.83 0.83 0.83
Note: *, **, signi¯cant at 10%, 5% error probability.
Default categories: D: Age 18-24, D: FirmSize >= 2000, D: ISCED Low-Skilled.
All speci¯cations contain individual ¯xed e®ects and full dummy sets for occupation,
federal state and time as well as occupation speci¯c linear time trends.
Inverse sample probability weighted regression with cluster-robust standard errors.
35Table 8: Occupation-Speci¯c O®shoring: Non-Routine Tasks, Becker et al. (2009)-
Classi¯cation
(a) (b) (c)
Dependent variable: Log hourly wage
D:Married 0.0224 0.0217 0.0221
[0.0154] [0.0156] [0.0157]
D: Has Children 0.0081 0.008 0.0084
[0.0117] [0.0118] [0.0118]
D: FirmSize < 20 -0.0133 -0.0129 -0.0126
[0.0398] [0.0404] [0.0401]
D: FirmSize20 ¡ 199 -0.0573 -0.0572 -0.0573
[0.0330]* [0.0331]* [0.0329]*
D: FirmSize200 ¡ 1999 -0.0146 -0.0153 -0.0148
[0.0137] [0.0136] [0.0135]
D: Public Firm 0.001 0.0019 0.0025
[0.0408] [0.0419] [0.0419]
D: Firm Owner not reported 0.0217 0.0215 0.0218
[0.0581] [0.0581] [0.0577]
Tenure 0.0015 0.0016 0.0016
[0.0020] [0.0019] [0.0019]
WorkExperienceFulltime 0.0233 0.0238 0.0243
[0.0183] [0.0183] [0.0184]
WorkExperienceFull ¡ time2 -0.0003 -0.0003 -0.0003
[0.0001]*** [0.0001]*** [0.0001]***
WorkExperiencePart ¡ time 0.025 0.0266 0.0283
[0.0597] [0.0606] [0.0610]
WorkExperiencePart ¡ time2 -0.0083 -0.0085 -0.0085
[0.0087] [0.0089] [0.0089]
D: Recent Unemployment -0.1615 -0.1614 -0.1614
[0.0278]*** [0.0277]*** [0.0278]***
D: ISCED High-Skilled 0.0571 0.0759 0.0505
[0.0436] [0.0973] [0.1061]









R&D=Y £ High ¡ Skilled -2.5036 -1.0004
[2.9936] [3.1702]
R&D=Y £ Medium ¡ Skilled 0.3412 0.6691
[2.6313] [2.6838]
R&D=Y £ Low ¡ Skilled -1.8342 -2.0011
[2.2279] [2.1995]
CapEqu=Y 0.1013 0.1147 0.1436
[0.4286] [0.4278] [0.4320]




OS £ High ¡ Skilled -0.0193 -0.0188
[0.0093]** [0.0260]
OS £ Medium ¡ Skilled -0.0282 -0.0381
[0.0081]*** [0.0158]**
OS £ Low ¡ Skilled -0.0193 -0.039
[0.0062]*** [0.0109]***
OS £ Task Index £ High ¡ Skilled 0.0047
[0.0301]
OS £ Task Index £ Medium ¡ Skilled 0.0193
[0.0232]
OS £ Task Index £ Low ¡ Skilled 0.0372
[0.0219]*
Constant 122.7105 124.3848 121.7589
[36.1652]*** [36.5883]*** [36.6548]***
Observations 13189 13189 13189
R2 0.83 0.83 0.83
Note: *, **, signi¯cant at 10%, 5% error probability.
Default categories: D: Age 18-24, D: FirmSize >= 2000, D: ISCED Low-Skilled.
All speci¯cations contain individual ¯xed e®ects and full dummy sets for federal state,
occupation and time as well as occupation speci¯c linear time trends.
Inverse sample probability weighted regression with cluster-robust standard errors.
37Table 9: Occupation-Speci¯c O®shoring: Classi¯cation based on Spitz-Oener (2006)
Interactive Non-Routine
Dependent variable: Log hourly wage
D:Married 0.0238 0.0233
[0.0156] [0.0156]
D: Has Children 0.0065 0.0068
[0.0120] [0.0121]
D: FirmSize < 20 -0.0138 -0.0135
[0.0401] [0.0403]
D: FirmSize20 ¡ 199 -0.0556 -0.0556
[0.0333]* [0.0333]
D: FirmSize200 ¡ 1999 -0.0135 -0.0135
[0.0137] [0.0137]
D: Public Firm 0.0027 0.0021
[0.0423] [0.0422]






WorkExperienceFull ¡ time2 -0.0003 -0.0003
[0.0001]*** [0.0001]***
WorkExperiencePart ¡ time 0.0255 0.0254
[0.0607] [0.0606]
WorkExperiencePart ¡ time2 -0.0081 -0.008
[0.0088] [0.0088]
D: Recent Unemployment -0.1635 -0.1638
[0.0277]*** [0.0277]***
D: ISCED High-Skilled 0.097 0.0639
[0.0748] [0.0789]




Production Value Y -0.001 -0.0011
[0.0021] [0.0022]
R&D=Y
R&D=Y £ High ¡ Skilled -0.5632 0.2332
[3.1291] [3.2618]
R&D=Y £ Medium ¡ Skilled 0.6758 0.781
[2.7191] [2.7581]







OS £ High ¡ Skilled -0.0202 -0.0142
[0.0133] [0.0165]
OS £ Medium ¡ Skilled -0.0488 -0.0533
[0.0101]*** [0.0125]***
OS £ Low ¡ Skilled -0.0398 -0.046
[0.0064]*** [0.0081]***
OS £ Task Index £ High ¡ Skilled 0.0188 0.0076
[0.0215] [0.0218]
OS £ Task Index £ Medium ¡ Skilled 0.0622 0.0566
[0.0195]*** [0.0207]***






Note: *, **, signi¯cant at 10%, 5% error probability.
Default categories: D: Age 18-24, D: FirmSize >= 2000, D: ISCED Low-Skilled.
All speci¯cations contain individual ¯xed e®ects and full dummy sets for federal state,
occupation and time as well as occupation speci¯c linear time trends.
Inverse sample probability weighted regression with cluster-robust standard errors.
39Table 10: Occupation-Speci¯c O®shoring: Economic Signi¯cance Calculations
Average Hourly Wage 1991 Low-Skilled Medium Skilled High-Skilled
in Euro 14.85 16.81 26.40
Task Classi¯cation following Becker et al. (2009)
Interactive Tasks
Joint Signi¯cance of OS F=9.39 F=8.40 F=1.89
p= 0.0003 p=0.0006 p=0.1595
Cumulated OS e®ect 1991-2006 in Euro in percent in Euro in percent in Euro in percent
Interactive 10th percentile -1.31 -8.85 -1.64 -9.74 -0.61 -2.32
Interactive 50th percentile -0.77 -5.17 -1.01 -6.01 -0.92 -3.47
Interactive 90th percentile -0.29 -1.97 -0.73 -4.34 -1.01 -3.82
Non-Routine Tasks
Joint Signi¯cance of OS F=10.15 F= 5.49 F=1.06
p=0.0002 p= 0.0065 p=0.3513
Cumulated OS e®ect 1991-2006 in Euro in percent in Euro in Euro
Non-Routine 10th percentile -1.06 -7.14 -1.23 -7.30 -0.94 -3.56
Non-Routine 50th percentile -0.83 -5.56 -1.01 -6.03 -0.86 -3.26
Non-Routine 90th percentile -0.35 -2.32 -0.72 -4.31 -0.83 -3.16
Task Classi¯cation based on Spitz-Oener (2006)
Interactive Tasks
Joint Signi¯cance of OS F=20.14 F=11.80 F= 1.16
p=0.0000 p=0.0000 p=0.3209
Cumulated OS e®ect 1991-2006 in Euro in percent in Euro in percent in Euro in percent
Interactive 10th percentile -1.06 -7.15 -1.56 -9.28 -0.66 -2.49
Interactive 50th percentile -0.88 -5.92 -0.79 -4.68 -0.50 -1.90
Interactive 90th percentile -0.09 -0.61 0.20 1.20 -0.22 -0.85
Non-Routine Tasks
Joint Signi¯cance of OS F=19.37 F=9.49 F=0.50
p=0.0000 p=0.0003 p= 0.6101
Cumulated OS e®ect 1991-2006 in Euro in percent in Euro in percent in Euro in percent
Non-Routine 10th percentile -1.17 -7.86 -1.63 -9.68 -0.55 -2.08
Non-Routine 50th percentile -0.84 -5.63 -0.82 -4.85 -0.50 -1.91
Non-Routine 90th percentile -0.11 -0.76 -0.08 -0.50 -0.42 -1.58
Note: Bold ¯gures correspond to jointly signi¯cant o®shoring/interaction terms.
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1980, 48 (4), 817{838.Appendix 1: Task Classi¯cation
Table A1: Classi¯cation of tasks following Becker et al. (2009)
Non-routine tasks Interactive tasks
Tools or devices
Simple tools













Plants for power generation
Automatic warehouse systems
Other machinery, plants




Other measuring instruments, diagnosis
Computers
Personal or o±ce computers





Other computers, EDP devices
O±ce and communication equipment
Simple writing material
Typewriter
Desktop calculator, pocket calculator
Fixed telephone x
Telephone with ISDN connection x
Answering machine x
Mobile telephone, walkie-talkie, pager x
Fax device, telecopier
Speech dictation device, microphone x
Overhead projector, beamer, TV x x





Truck, conventional truck x




Simple means of transport x
Tractor, agricultural machine
Excavating, road-building machine x
Lifting-aids on vehicles x
Forklift, lifting truck






Other vehicles, lifting means
Other tools and aids
Therapeutic aids x x
Musical instruments x x
Weapons x x
Surveillance camera, radar device
Fire extinguisher x x
Cash register x
Scanner cash register, bar-code reader x
Other devices, implements





Special, scienti¯c program x
Use of other software
Computer handling by workers with computers
Program development, systems analysis x
Device, plant, system support x
User support, training x x
Computer use by any worker
Professional use: personal computer x
Machinery handling by workers with machinery
Operation of program-controlled machinery
Installation of program-controlled machinery x
Programming of program-controlled machinery x
Monitoring of program-controlled machinery x
Maintenance, repairs x x
Source: Becker et al. (2009). Items refer to the list of questioned tools in the German Quali¯cation and Career Survey 1998/99.
The authors' strict classi¯cation is used.Table A2: Classi¯cation of tasks based on Spitz-Oener (2006)
Non-routine tasks Interactive tasks
Training and teaching others x x
Consulting, informing others x x
Measuring, testing, quality controlling
Surveillance, operating machinery, plants, or processes
Repairing, renovating x
Purchasing, procuring, selling x x
Organizing, planning x x
Advertising, public relations, marketing, promoting business x x
Information acquisition and analysis, investigations x
Conducting negotiations x x
Development, research x
Manufacture or production of merchandize
Providing for, waiting on, caring for people x x
Items refer to the list of questioned job descriptions in the German Quali¯cation and Career Survey 1998/99.
Appendix 2: Exogeneity
For simplicity assume a reduced version of Equation 6
lnWAGEijt = ® + ¸OSjt + ²ijt (7)
Simultaneity bias occurs if o®shoring is not only determining wages
but also is a function of wages, i.e.,
OS = ! + 'lnWAGE + & (8)
with ' 6= 0 must hold.










with '¸ 6= 1. We further can derive that, ceteris paribus, the size of the
bias increases in ' as @bias
@' > 0.
If in our example one were to use industry-level data, as most related











Since Cov(OSjt;lnWAGEjt) = Cov(OSjt;lnWAGEijt) and
V ar(lnWAGEijt) > V ar(lnWAGEjt) it follows that 'disagg < 'agg.
Thus, through the combination of industry-level o®shoring measures with
micro-level wage data we can utilize the larger wage variance to reduce
potential endogeneity bias. To illustrate, in our individual-level data
we have V ar(lnWAGEijt) = 0:1495. If one aggregates the individual-
level data to construct average wages at the industry level one hasV ar(lnWAGEjt) = 0:0335. Accordingly, in our application 'disagg is
almost 5 times lower than 'agg.
Table A2: Exogeneity Tests of O®shoring
Interactive Non-Routine
Column a, Table 3 Column a, Table 4
First Stage F-test
OS F = 23:83 F = 23:86
p = 0:0000 p = 0:0000
Kleibergen-Paap rank LM statistic of underidenti¯cation
Chi2 = 21:32 Chi2) = 21:36
p = 0:0000 p = 0:0000
Hansen J statistic for excluded instruments
Chi2 = 0:001 Chi2 = 0:000
p = 0:9778 p = 0:9861
C-test of Endogeneity
Chi2 = 0:959 Chi2 = 0:989
p = 0:3275 p = 0:3200
Excluded Instruments: OSt¡1, OSt¡2